The University of the Pacific Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 4 Symposium: Sex Crimes & Offenses in an Era
of Reform

Article 11

1-1-2016

The Aftermath of Governor McDonnell’s
Corruption Trial: Proposing Comprehensive
Ethics Reform in Virginia
Lisa Jane Lindhorst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lisa J. Lindhorst, The Aftermath of Governor McDonnell’s Corruption Trial: Proposing Comprehensive Ethics Reform in Virginia, 47 U. Pac.
L. Rev. 733 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview/vol47/iss4/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
The University of the Pacific Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

The Aftermath of Governor McDonnell’s Corruption Trial:
Proposing Comprehensive Ethics Reform in Virginia
Lisa Jane Lindhorst*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 773
II. INADEQUACIES IN VIRGINIA’S CURRENT ETHICS LAWS ............................... 774
A. Ethics Oversight and Enforcement Bodies ............................................ 776
1. Inadequacies in Virginia’s Current Ethics Oversight Bodies......... 776
2. Strengths and Variations Amongst State Ethics Commissions
Across the Nation ............................................................................ 778
B. Ethics Rules Governing Gifts to Government Officials ......................... 782
1. Inadequacies in Virginia’s Laws Regulating Gifts to State
Officials........................................................................................... 783
2. Federal Gift Caps and Disclosure Laws as a Successful Model
for Virginia ..................................................................................... 784
III. PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE ETHICS CODE REFORM IN VIRGINIA....... 786
A. Creating a Permanent, Independent, and Powerful Ethics
Commission ........................................................................................... 786
B. Adopting Stricter Definitions of Who Can Give Gifts to Government
Officials ................................................................................................. 788
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 790
I. INTRODUCTION
Former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell and his wife Maureen bowed
their heads and wept as the word “guilty” poured from the court clerk’s mouth.1
A federal jury convicted the couple of twenty counts of corruption, fraud, and
bribery for illegally accepting over $165,000 in gifts and loans from the CEO of
a local company.2 This is not the only widely publicized political scandal in
Virginia’s recent history. The Washington Post also recently revealed that

*
J.D., The George Washington University Law School, 2015. Admitted to practice in California.
1. Larry O’Dell, Bob McDonnell Convicted On Political Corruption Charges, SALON (Sept. 4, 2014),
http://www.salon.com/2014/09/04/bob_mcdonnell_convicted_on_political_corruption_charges/ (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review); Bob McDonnell’s Trial Comes to Merciful End, But The Weirdness
And The Shame Remain, HUFF. POST (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/06/mcdonnelltrial-ends_n_5776902.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. O’Dell, supra note 1; Bob McDonnell’s Trial Comes to Merciful End, supra note 1.
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Virginia’s Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli accepted $18,000 worth of gifts from
the same CEO, including vacation getaways, family holidays at a luxurious
estate, and an extravagant Thanksgiving dinner.3 In 2009, shortly before the
Cuccinelli and McDonnell debacles, a federal Judge convicted Virginia
Assembly member Phil Hamilton of bribery and extortion for using his power as
Vice Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee to channel funds to Old
Dominion University as a quid pro quo for securing a part-time teaching position
there.4 Hamilton is currently serving a nine-and-a-half year prison sentence.5
The most troubling aspect of these political scandals is that although the
egregious conduct amounted to fraud, corruption, bribery, and extortion under
federal criminal laws, the activities were all legal under Virginia’s ethics laws.
The disparity between federal criminal laws and Virginia’s ethics laws sheds
light on how desperately Virginia needs more robust and comprehensive ethics
standards. Part II highlights two problematic aspects of Virginia’s ethics laws
that allowed these scandals to occur and uses comparisons to laws in other states
and at the federal level to illustrate Virginia’s shortcomings, despite recent
reform efforts.6 Part III proposes additional ethics reforms for Virginia to
undertake, which include the creation of a robust ethics oversight and
enforcement body and the adoption of stricter regulations on gifts that Virginia’s
state officials may accept.7 Part IV concludes with a brief warning about what
Virginia’s political future could look like absent such a reform.8
II. INADEQUACIES IN VIRGINIA’S CURRENT ETHICS LAWS
The breadth and depth of state ethics rules vary widely across jurisdictions,
but all ethics laws share the common goal of promoting public trust in the
government by regulating interactions with government officials that could lead
to actual or apparent corruption.9 Every state in the nation codifies ethics

3. Peter Galuszka, Cuccinelli And The Virginia Gift Scandal, WASH. POST (July 11, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-local/post/ken-cuccinelli-and-the-virginia-giftscandal/2013/07/11/889360fc-ea53-11e2-8f22-de4bd2a2bd39_blog.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); Bob Gibson, Virginia’s Convicted: The Problems Behind ‘Let Them Police Themselves’,
DAILY PROGRESS (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/columnists/virginia-s-convicted-theproblems-behind-let-them-police-themselves/article_e9535a1c-4184-11e4-96c1-0017a43b2370.html. (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
4. Hugh Lessig & Kimball Payne, Job Talks Preceded ODU Bill, DAILY PRESS (Aug. 21, 2009), http://
www.dailypress.com/news/dp-local_hamiltonline_0821aug21,0,6608958.story (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
5. Gibson, supra note 3.
6. See infra Part II; see also State Integrity Investigation, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/accountability/state-integrity-investigation/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
7. Infra Part III.
8. Infra Part IV.
9. See State Integrity Investigation, supra note 6.
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standards that govern conduct of government officials in that particular state.10
Some states codify their ethics laws in statutes and others enshrine ethics
standards in the state’s Constitution.11 Some states model their ethics laws on the
federal government’s standards, and others tailor them to the particular state.12
Because of the variations between state ethics codes, some are more robust and
effective than others. The State Integrity Investigation,13 for example, grades
states from A to F according to which ethics laws most effectively reduce abuses
of power, corruption, and betrayal of public trust.14
The State Integrity Investigation gave Virginia’s ethics laws an “F” grade,
remarking that “the state lacks the necessary oversight . . . [and w]hile other
states have made efforts to ensure accuracy, often with the creation of an
independent commission, Virginia’s legislators are mostly left to police
themselves.”15 Virginia Governor McAuliffe recently cited the state’s failing
State Integrity Investigation grade as “one of the many warnings the state has
received on its mediocre record on accountability and transparency.”16 Local
Newspapers and critics explain that “[a]ctivities illegal elsewhere are legal [in
Virginia] simply because the law is silent or sieved with loopholes.”17 This Part
provides an overview of two specific areas of Virginia’s ethics laws that are
particularly problematic: the total absence of an ethics enforcement and oversight
body, and the gaps in the rules governing gift giving to state officials that have
persisted through recent reform efforts.

10. See Links to States’ Legislative Ethics and Lobbying Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-legislative-ethics-and-lobbying-laws.aspx (last visited Apr. 16,
2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
11. For example, in Oklahoma, ethics provisions are found in Article XXIX of the State Constitution.
See OKLA. STATE LEGIS., http://www.oklegislature.gov/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2016) (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
12. For links to the different state ethics laws throughout the nation, see Links to States’ Legislative
Ethics and Lobbying Laws, supra note 10.
13. The State Integrity Investigation is a data-driven analysis of each state’s laws and practices that deter
corruption and promote accountability and openness. Experienced journalists graded each state government on
its corruption risk using 330 specific measures, and then ranked every state from 1 to 50. See State Integrity
Investigation, supra note 6.
14. See id.
15. Caitlin Ginley, States of Disclosure, Louisiana, Mississippi Movin’ Up; 20 States Still Flunk, CTR.
PUB. INTEGRITY (June 24, 2009), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/states_of_
FOR
disclosure/articles/entry/1428 #continue (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. Nicholas Kusnetz, McAuliffe to Reform Virginia’s Ethics Laws, STATE INTEGRITY INVESTIGATION
(Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.stateintegrity.org/mcauliffe_names_panel_to_reform_virginia_s_ethics_laws (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
17. See Daniel Gilbert, Elected Officials Failing to Ensure Transparency, CULPEPER STAR EXPONENT
(July 27, 2009), http://www2.starexponent.com/cse/news/state_regional/article/elected_officials (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review); Jeff E. Shapiro, The G-man is Sniffing at the Capitol, TIMES
DISPATCH
(June
28,
2009),
http://www2.timesdispatch.com/rtd/news/columnists_news/article/
JEFF28_20090627-215004/276822 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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A. Ethics Oversight and Enforcement Bodies
Ethics enforcement bodies are the first line of defense in protecting the
public’s trust in its government. An ethics enforcement body is not sufficient to
combat corruption on its own—comprehensive ethics laws are also necessary—
but the quality of ethics laws mean little without an independent entity that
investigates and enforces them.18 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the state with the
highest overall Center for Public Integrity grade in the nation is also the state
with the most robust enforcement system: New Jersey.19 Part of the reason for
New Jersey’s successful enforcement ranking is the state’s use of an independent
ethics commission that possesses a variety of enforcement powers.20 Ethics
commissions throughout the country vary significantly, but the mere presence of
an ethics commission, regardless of its particular form, significantly bolsters
ethics compliance due to its constant and authoritative presence.21
Virginia is one of only ten states22 in the nation that does not have an
independent ethics commission.23 Instead, Virginia has an ethics committee and
an advisory council, both of which have no enforcement capabilities.24 The Phil
Hamilton scandal illustrates the futility of Virginia’s ethics committee because
Hamilton was able to use his trusted role in Virginia’s House Appropriations
Committee to channel funds to a private university to secure himself a job right
in front of the ethics committee’s dormant eyes.25 This Part discusses the
inadequacies of Virginia’s ethics committee, explains how ethics commissions
and ethics committees differ, and overviews the variations of state ethics
commissions throughout the country.
1. Inadequacies in Virginia’s Current Ethics Oversight Bodies
Instead of creating an independent ethics commission to enforce and oversee
its ethics standards as most states have done, Virginia has a partisan ethics
committee composed of elected officials with a very limited investigatory

18. Mike Mullen, Putting Teeth in State Ethics Laws Requires Independent Enforcement, ALLIANCE,
http://www.stateintegrity.org/ethics_enforcement (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
19. See State Integrity Investigation, supra note 6.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ginley, supra note 15 (the others are Arizona, Idaho, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming); See also Kayla Crider & Jeffrey Milyo, Do State Ethics Commissions
Reduce Political Corruption? An Exploratory Investigation, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 717, 720 (2013).
23. See Links to States’ Legislative Ethics and Lobbying Laws, supra note 10; Christopher E. Piper,
Ethics in Virginia: Reforming Ethics and Conflict of Interest Laws in the 2010 Virginia General Assembly, 14
RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 13, 14 (2010).
24. Piper, supra note 23, at 13.
25. Id.; Lessig & Payne, supra note 4.
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mandate.26 One significant shortcoming of Virginia’s ethics committee is that it
may only institute investigations against current members of the legislature.27 As
such, any ethics violations that Virginia’s executive or judicial branch officials
commit, or violations by legislators that have since left public office, fall outside
the committee’s jurisdiction.28 Additionally, Virginia’s ethics committee may
only begin an investigation upon receipt of a signed and sworn complaint by a
citizen of the state;29 the committee may not initiate investigations sua sponte.30
Once Virginia’s ethics committee receives a complaint from a citizen and
completes an investigation, the committee’s only options are to dismiss the
claim, refer findings to a Privileges and Elections Committee with
recommendations,31 or refer findings to the Attorney General.32 Although the
Privileges and Elections Committee can remove the transgressor with a twothirds majority vote and the Attorney General can choose an “action he deems
appropriate,” the ethics committee itself has no such power.33 The committee also
does not have authority to offer advisory opinions on the law, which inhibits the
committee from disseminating standards and norms beyond the precise fact
pattern being investigated.34 In sum, Virginia’s ethics committee is significantly
limited in its ability to oversee and enforce the state’s ethics rules.
Virginia lawmakers have made several unsuccessful attempts to strengthen
the power of Virginia’s ethics enforcement bodies. After the Hamilton scandal,
Virginia’s legislature proposed multiple bills to strengthen the power of the
ethics committee, none of which made it into law.35 Governor McDonnell
attempted a reform effort when he used the promise of an independent ethics
commission as a platform in his 2009 gubernatorial campaign.36 Once voters
elected McDonnell, however, he decided against the commission, claiming it was

26. Piper, supra note 23, at 15.
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-116 (2009).
28. Id. In the case of Hamilton, he resigned after losing his bid for reelection, after which he fell outside
the Panel’s jurisdiction, and was therefore only subject to criminal extortion charges for his quid pro quo with
ODU. See Piper, supra note 23, at 15.
29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 30-114.
30. Meaning on the committee’s own initiative. See id.
31. Id. § 30-116(2).
32. Id. The committee refers to the Attorney General if the committee believes the legislator being
investigated willfully violated the law. Id.
33. Piper, supra note 23, at 16.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-114.
35. See, e.g., H.B. 1140, 2010 GEN. ASSEMB., REG. SESS. (Va. 2010) (as introduced Jan. 13, 2010); H.B.
813, 2010 GEN. ASSEMB., REG. SESS. (Va. 2010) (as introduced Jan. 13, 2010). Compare H.B. 814, 2010 GEN.
ASSEMB., REG. SESS. (Va. 2010) (as introduced Jan. 13, 2010), and S.B. 186, 2010 GEN. ASSEMB., REG. SESS.
(Va. 2010) (as introduced Jan. 13, 2010), with H.B. 655, 2010 GEN. ASSEMB., REG. SESS. (Va. 2010) (enacted).
36. See Sean Gorman, Ethics Panel Deemed Unnecessary, TIMES DISPATCH (Aug. 13, 2012)
http://www.politifact.com/virginia/promises/bob-o-meter/promise/985/establish-ethics-commission/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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redundant with his creation of a state inspector general’s (IG) office.37 The IG’s
mandate, however, is primarily to root out fraud, waste, and abuse in
government, and the IG may only investigate ethics violations of government
officials if the governor, attorney general, or a grand jury makes a request.38 As
recent events demonstrate, these limitations on the IG’s authority are particularly
problematic when the individuals violating ethics requirements are the
individuals who should be requesting IG investigations.39
In 2014 and 2015, Governor McAuliffe fought for the creation of an
independent ethics commission, but lawmakers refused.40 Instead, the Virginia
legislature created and funded a nine-member advisory council, with members
appointed by the governor and General Assembly.41 The council merely issues
advisory opinions for lawmakers requesting guidance, and approves or denies
lawmakers’ requests to take lobbyist-funded trips that exceed the gift cap.42
Lawmakers also rejected McAuliffe’s proposed amendment that gave the council
power to randomly audit lawmakers’ disclosure forms.43 As such, the council
merely responds to state officials’ self-initiated inquiries and cannot investigate
or enforce any ethics violations independently.44 Thus, even with these recent
reform efforts, Virginia’s ethics oversight and enforcement system remains one
of the weakest in the nation.45
2. Strengths and Variations Amongst State Ethics Commissions Across the
Nation
It is important to examine the various types of ethics commissions states use
throughout the country before proposing an effective ethics commission for
Virginia. Ethics commissions vary across jurisdictions, but all commissions
generally meet monthly to undertake investigations, hold hearings on alleged
ethics violations, issue advisory opinions, and impose punishments for ethics

37. See id. This is ironic considering McDonnell committed bribery and fraud right under the IG’s nose.
38. See VA. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., https://osig.virginia.gov/about/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2016)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
39. See, e.g., O’Dell, supra note 1.
40. See Bob Brown, Omnibus Ethics Bill Backed by House Committee, TIMES DISPATCH (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/article_530b46f1-7f26-59a0-a5d4-9c9471ed9d99.html (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
41. See Senate Bill 649 and 143, and House Bill 1211. The Bill summaries are contained in the
Legislation Tracking website, http://leg1.state.va.us. See Jim Nolan, Lawmakers Reach Agreement On Ethics
Reform, TIMES DISPATCH (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/state-regional/lawmakers-reachagreement-on-ethics-reform/article_ebbf3cf0-a6e6-11e3-8763-001a4bcf6878.html (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
42. Id.
43. See Nolan, supra note 41.
44. See id. In fact, the panel cannot even respond if an official goes against the panel’s recommendation.
Id.
45. Piper, supra note 23, at 20.
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violations.46 Regardless of how ethics commissions vary from state to state, the
power and function of an ethics commission in general is superior to that of an
ethics committee.47 Ethics commissions are more independent because they
consist of members of the public and gubernatorial appointees, whereas ethics
committee members are partisan-elected officials.48 Ethics commissions also
have a wide range of enforcement tools at their disposal,49 whereas ethics
committees are merely investigatory and refer their findings to another body for
adjudication.50 Most importantly, ethics commissions have a more effective and
intimidating presence because they conduct routine checks and sua sponte
investigations,51 as opposed to merely meeting to respond to complaints.52
Additionally, ethics commissions also vary widely from commission to
commission in terms of composition, appointment procedures, term lengths,
jurisdiction, and enforcement power.53 Some state ethics commissions have a
combination of partisan members and members of the public, others have only
members of the public, and still others have only partisan members with varying
restrictions on how to split the membership down party lines.54 Twenty-eight
states forbid their commissioners from holding other public office, office in a
political party or campaign committee, or employment by lobbyist groups until
their term on the commission ends.55 Some states bar commissioners from
holding public office anywhere from one to five years before their commission
term begins,56 and other states also prohibit commissioners from assuming public
office anywhere from one to three years after their commission term ends.57
46. See Crider & Milyo, supra note 22, at 721.
47. See id.; Piper, supra note 23, at 14; Links to States’ Legislative Ethics and Lobbying Laws, supra
note 10.
48. Piper, supra note 23, at 14–15; Links to States’ Legislative Ethics and Lobbying Laws, supra note
10.
49. See infra next paragraph.
50. See Part II.A.1 (discussing the shortcomings inherent in Virginia’s ethics commission); Piper, supra
note 23, at 16.
51. Reforming Ethics and Conflict of Interest Laws In The 2010 Virginia General Assembly, 14 RICH.
J.L. & PUB. INT. 13, 14–15 (2010); Links to States’ Legislative Ethics and Lobbying Laws, supra note 10.
52. See Part 0.0.0; Piper, supra note 23, at 14–15; Links to States’ Legislative Ethics and Lobbying
Laws, supra note 10.
53. Crider & Milyo, supra note 22, at 720.
54. Id. at 721. For example, commissions in Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee are evenly split
between the two major parties. However, Colorado, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, and
Texas merely require that no single party hold a majority of commission seats.
55. See id. at 721.
56. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-4(d) (2003). The Georgia State Ethics Commission eligibility
requirements prohibit the appointment of anyone who has held federal, state, or local public office within the
five-year period prior to appointment; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-80(b) (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 1, § 1002(2) (1989); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1106(a) (West 2000). Other states with such preappointment requirements include Connecticut, Maine, and Pennsylvania, with periods ranging from one to five
years).
57. For example, Missouri and Arizona. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.955 (West 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 38-504 (2001).
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Another important variation between state ethics commissions is who
appoints each commissioner and how long each commissioner serves on the
commission. In Delaware, for example, the governor appoints the members of the
commission and the Senate confirms each appointee.58 In Oregon, the governor
appoints three of the commission’s members, and Democratic and Republican
leaders of the House and Senate recommend the other four members.59 Most
states also stagger the terms of their commissioners to ensure retention of
institutional knowledge.60 These staggered terms range from three years in
Maine61 and Pennsylvania,62 to six years in Iowa,63 Montana,64 and Ohio.65
The jurisdictional reach of state ethics commissions varies as well. Although
some states only permit their ethics commission to investigate and penalize
transgressors who currently hold public office, other states allow their
commission to proceed against transgressors even after they have left state
service.66 For example, in New York, state employees remain subject to the
jurisdiction of the ethics commission after leaving state service, so long as the
commission’s investigation begins within one year after the employee leaves
public service.67 Other jurisdictions have been slower to follow New York’s lead,
but these states lament the enforcement difficulties that occur when the
commission’s jurisdiction ends after the government official leaves office.68
Ethics commissions throughout the country also differ in enforcement
capabilities. Common ethics commission enforcement powers include the ability
to remove transgressors from office, disqualify them from future elections,
impose future employment bans upon them, and require them to pay hefty fines
or serve prison sentences.69 The range of civil and criminal penalties that state
commissions impose range from $100 fines with no prison term in Wisconsin,70
to $10,000 fines with a maximum five-year term of imprisonment in
Pennsylvania,71 to a $50,000 maximum fine in Oklahoma.72 In addition, some

58. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 29, § 5808(b) (2003).
59. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.250 (West 2003).
60. See Crider & Milyo, supra note 22, at 721.
61. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 1, § 1002 (Supp. 2004).
62. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN §1106(b) (West 2000).
63. IOWA CODE ANN. § 68B.32(2) (West 1999).
64. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 13-37-103 (2003).
65. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.05.
66. Crider & Milyo, supra note 22, at 721.
67. See, e.g., Michael Slackman, Albany Ethics Case That Died Points to Loophole, Not a Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at A1.
68. See Crider & Milyo, supra note 22, at 721.
69. For example, in Ohio, a conviction based on a violation of ethics laws can result in disqualification
from holding public office or employment for up to seven years. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.43(E).
70. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.58; 65
71. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1109(a) (West 2000).
72. OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 74, § 62, App. 257:1-1-11 (West 2000).
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states impose unjust enrichment penalties, such as treble damages in
Pennsylvania,73 and fines based on a percentage of the amount of unjust
enrichment in Nebraska.74 Commissions that monitor financial disclosure forms
also have penalty schemes for late filers ranging from a one-time fee to a per-day
fine.75 Regardless of these variations in enforcement powers amongst different
commissions, the efficacy of ethics commissions in general is largely attributable
to the presence of at least some significant enforcement capability.76
A brief look at New Jersey, which the State Integrity Investigation gave the
highest “Ethics Enforcement” rank to, provides a valuable illustration of an
effective ethics commission.77 New Jersey got its “A” State Integrity
Investigation grade because of the state’s independent ethics agency has broad
powers of investigation and a rigorous structure that prevents outside
interference.78 New Jersey’s ethics commission consists of seven commissioners:
four members of the public (not more than two of whom are of the same political
party) that serve four-year staggered terms until the appointment of their
successors,79 and three executive branch gubernatorial appointees who serve until
the governor appoints a successor.80 The Governor also picks which two public
members will serve as chairman and vice-chairman of the commission.81
Additionally, New Jersey’s ethics commission has a unique toll-free hotline for
anonymous complaints, which the commission only dismisses if “patently
frivolous.”82 This combination of independent commissioners, staggered terms,
and anonymous complaints procedures plays a big role in New Jersey’s
outstanding reputation in the area of ethics oversight and enforcement.83
Although a robust enforcement commission is vital to a functioning system of
ethics laws, the substantive ethics laws each state charges its commission with
enforcing are similarly crucial.

73. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1109(c).
74. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1612
75. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.02(F) (the Ohio Ethics Commission imposes a $10 per-day
late fine, up to a maximum of $250); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.99 (knowingly failing to file a financial
disclosure form carries potential penalties of up to $1,000 and six months’ jail time); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42.1157(A)(5)(b) (Supp. 2005) (the Louisiana Ethics Administration Program imposes a $50 per-day fine, up
to $1,500); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84.17(i) (the Hawaii State Ethics Commission imposes an initial fine of
$50, plus a $10 per-day fine, with no maximum limit).
76. Mullen, supra note 18.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. State of New Jersey, State Ethics Commission, http://www.state.nj.us/ethics/about/ (last visited Apr.
27, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Mullen, supra note 18 (meaning the complaint, without a doubt, has no value; citing New Jersey
ethics commission’s executive director, Peter Tober).
83. Id.

781

2016 / The Aftermath of Governor McDonnell's Corruption Trial
B. Ethics Rules Governing Gifts to Government Officials
Stringent gift rules to ensure government officials do not wrongfully use their
public positions for private gain are of particular importance to any state ethics
laws, because the majority of public corruption cases involve government
officials receiving extravagant gifts, meals, or entertainment.84 The Washington
Post’s incessant coverage of streams of expensive gifts between the CEO of a
prominent local company85 and former Virginia Governor McDonnell and his
family86 illustrate the consequences of gaps in the rules governing gift giving to
state officials. Until last year, Virginia had no cap on the value of gifts elected
officials could receive; there was merely a reporting requirement.87 Moreover,
Virginia did not require state officials to disclose gifts given to their immediate
family, regardless of the value.88 The State Integrity Investigation ranked
Virginia 47th out of 50 due to the ineffectiveness of these gift caps and disclosure
rules, and gave Virginia a grade of “F.”89 Although Virginia lawmakers recently
attempted to address this glaring issue in Virginia’s ethics laws, Governor
McAuliffe tacitly acknowledged the inadequacy of the reform efforts.90 This Part
discusses the shortcomings of Virginia’s gift rules and employs a comparison to
the U.S. federal government gift rules to illustrate particularly troublesome
aspects of Virginia’s current standards.

84. See, e.g., Rosalind S. Helderman & Matt Zapotosky, Ex-VA Governor Robert McDonnell Guilty of
11 Counts of Corruption, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginiapolitics/mcdonnell-jury-in-third-day-of-deliberations/2014/09/04/0e01ff88-3435-11e4-9e920899b306bbea_story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Bill Marsh, Making
TIMES
(Jan.
1,
2006),
Connections
at
the
Skybox,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2006/01/01/weekinreview/20050101marsh.graph.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the infamous case of lobbyist Jack Abramoff, who bought
politicians expensive sports game tickets, then closed them in on political deals at the games); Robert L.
Jackson, The Resignation of Jim Wright: Speaker’s Downfall, LA TIMES (June 1, 1989),
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-06-01/news/mn-1334_1_public-man-ethics-committee-official-conduct (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing scandal in which House Speaker Jim Wright
illegally accepted $145,000 in gifts from Ft. Worth developer George A. Mallick, Jr.).
85. Star Scientific is a Richmond-based dietary supplement company.
86. Helderman & Zapotosky, supra note 84.
87. This disclosure requirement was very vague. For example, the nature of the gift and the date of
transactions were not required. Id.; Piper, supra note 23, at 15.
88. This is the loophole that is probably the largest contributor to covering up the McDonnell scandal, as
most gifts were given to McDonnell’s wife. See Piper, supra note 23, at 15.
89. See Kusnetz, supra note 16.
90. For example, see Senate Bill 649 and House Bills 1211, and 2070. See also Editorial Board, Virginia
Officials have a Chance to Add Teeth to Ethics Reform Legislation, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginia-officials-have-a-chance-to-add-teeth-to-ethics-reformlegislation/2015/03/30/c9961500-d718-11e4-b3f2-607bd612aeac_story.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
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1. Inadequacies in Virginia’s Laws Regulating Gifts to State Officials
Virginia’s current laws regulating gift giving to state officials are sieved with
loopholes. In 2014, Virginia lawmakers passed Senate Bill 649 and House Bill
1211, which set a $250 cap on individual tangible gifts state officials may receive
from lobbyists and other related sources,91 and required disclosure of such gifts
when given to state officials’ immediate family members.92 Although a welcome
step in the right direction, local newspapers characterized these new laws as “a
handful of watered-down reforms, stripped of meaningful changes to the rules
governing gifts and disclosure, which are among the weakest in the nation.”93
The Washington Post went as far as to call these 2014 laws “so slack it would be
disingenuous to refer to it as ‘reform.’”94
The legislature responded to the attacks on their inadequate reform efforts
with a 2015 bill that reduced the $250 gift cap to $100 and included intangible
gifts into the definition as well.95 However, as ProgressVA96 Executive Director
Anna Scholl explained, “[a]pproving the $100 aggregate gift cap was literally the
least legislators could do . . . [t]hey took action on a single, headline-grabbing

91. See id.; see also Nolan, supra note 41. These additional prohibited sources include a lobbyist’s
principal; or a person, business, or organization who is a party to, or seeking to become a party to, certain
governmental contracts.
92. Rachel Weiner, Virginia Lawmakers Detail Ethics Reform Idea, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-lawmakers-detail-ethics-reformplans/2014/01/07/3ad5c6ac-7734-11e3-8963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review). Governor McAuliffe signed an executive order upon entering office which restricts all of
Virginia’s executive branch employees from accepting gifts over $100 from any single source (which includes
gifts to their family members); however, this limitation does not apply to the other branches. Jim Nolan,
McAuliffe’s Ethics Panel Recommends Changes On Gift, Disclosure, Conflict Rules, TIMES DISPATCH (Nov. 14,
2014), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/state-regional/mcauliffe-s-ethics-panel-recommends-changes-ongift-disclosure-conflict/article_c344f081-fb86-5feb-89b9-899c461fd0f6.html?mode=jqm (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter McAuliffe’s Ethics Panel Recommends Changes].
93. See Jim Nolan, Va. Ethics Measure is Seen As Inadequate, DAILY PROGRESS (Apr. 2014),
http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/va-ethics-measure-is-seen-as-inadequate/article_b65cb470-c973-11e3addf-001a4bcf6878.html?mode=jqm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter Va.
Ethics Measure]; Virginia’s New Ethics Reform Commission Is A Welcome Step, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginias-new-ethics-reform-commission-is-a-welcomestep/2014/09/26/f4056ede-44fc-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review); McAuliffe’s Ethics Panel Recommends Changes, supra note 92.
94. Editorial Board, Virginia’s Ethics Bill Won’t Rein in Richmond’s Common Excesses, WASH. POST
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginias-ethics-bill-wont-rein-in-richmonds-common-excesses/2014/02/27/8913913a-9f31-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
95. Bob Brown, Legislature Approves Ethics Bill with $100 Aggregate Gift Cap, TIMES DISPATCH
(April 17, 2015), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/article_1d1225c8-3929-50998ce5-eace700186c9.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
96. PROGRESSVA, VIRGINIA’S 2015 ETHICS REFORM: AN ANALYSIS OF HB2070 AND ITS IMPACT ON
GIFT GIVING IN RICHMOND (2015). ProgressVA is a multi-issue progressive advocacy organization that
combines cutting edge online organizing and communications with rapid and hard-hitting earned media
strategies.
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item while refusing to approve a litany of proposals to strengthen the ethics bill
and increase transparency.”97 The 2014 and 2015 reform efforts left two glaring
loopholes. First, under Virginia’s current gift rules there are no caps on, nor
disclosure requirements for, gifts that government officials may receive on
account of “friendship,” nor any oversight body to determine when a purported
friendship is legitimate.98 The looseness of the term “friendship” paired with the
absence of an oversight body to define the term paves the way for unencumbered
exploitation of this loophole.
The second loophole that persisted through recent reform efforts is that the
new gift regulations still allow private parties to pay for state officials’ travel to
meetings and conferences with no disclosure requirement.99 Specifically, the new
laws do not include reimbursement for travel to national conferences in their
definition of a “gift.”100 Consequently, such travel is not subjected to a gift limit
and state officials do not need to disclose the amount they were reimbursed nor
the source of such reimbursement.101 This loophole allows elected officials to
accept free travel to lavish functions from special interests completely
undetected.102 Governor McAuliffe attempted to close this loophole in his
proposed amendments in HB 2070 and SB 1424, which lawmakers outright
rejected.103 Anna Scholl voiced her disapproval, stating “[s]hame on members of
the General Assembly for rejecting the Governors commonsense proposals to
close glaring loopholes in the ethics legislation” and “[i]t’s simply pathetic and
disgraceful these politicians put their own personal enrichment and convenience
ahead of integrity and transparency.”104 Thus, despite recent reform efforts, gift
caps and disclosure rules in Virginia remain ill equipped to end the stream of
political scandals permeating the state.
2. Federal Gift Caps and Disclosure Laws as a Successful Model for
Virginia
A comparison to the strict and comprehensive laws governing gift giving to
U.S. federal government officials illuminates the shortcomings of Virginia’s

97. General Assembly Refuses to Close Travel Loopholes in Ethics Bill, BLUE VIRGINIA (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.bluevirginia.us/diary/13180/virginia-news-headlines-friday-morning (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
98. See Va. Ethics Measure, supra note 93. The only limitation is that lobbyists cannot be considered a
friend. Id.
99. Patrick Wilson, Virginia Lawmakers Approve New Gift Limit Rules, PILOT ONLINE (Apr. 18, 2015),
http://hamptonroads.com/2015/04/virginia-lawmakers-approve-new-gift-limit-rules (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
100 PROGRESSVA, supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. General Assembly Refuses to Close, supra note 97.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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current standards.105 The general rule that applies to federal government
employees is that they may not receive gifts over $50106 from any outside source
that is not family or a close friend.107 The federal government designed its
comprehensive and detailed gift regulations to protect the integrity of the federal
government by ensuring government officials “act impartially and do not give
preferential treatment to any private organization or individual.”108 The federal
rules clearly define from whom government officials may receive gifts and
broadly define “gift,” including detailed exceptions and exclusions.
First, government employees cannot accept any gifts, directly or indirectly,
from a “prohibited source.”109 A “prohibited source” includes people or
organizations conducting business (or seeking business) with the federal
employee’s agency, people that the employee’s agency regulates, and people who
have an interest in the performance or nonperformance of the federal employee’s
official duties.110 Second, government employees cannot accept any gifts given
on account of their “official position.”111 The federal rules also carve out a clearly
defined exception for gifts from family members and personal friends to ensure
such legitimate gift-giving practices persist.112 To qualify as a gift due to a
personal relationship, however, the origin of the friendship, the history of gift
giving between the parties, and the nature and value of the gift must all indicate
that this gift had no basis in a business relationship.113 The Office of Government
Ethics (OGE)114 extends particular scrutiny to “friendships” that develop on the
job to prevent any unethical manipulation of this exception.115
In addition to having nuanced and comprehensive rules governing gift giving
to government employees, the federal government also effectively disseminates
these standards through the OGE’s user-friendly website, which provides detailed
guidance and training materials about the restrictions applicable to Government
officials.116 This combination of detailed parameters for gifts to federal

105. Jessica Tillipman, Gifts, Hospitality, and The Government Contractor, 14-7 BRIEFING PAPERS 1, 1
(June 2014). The federal rules also govern gift giving between government employees; however, this Article
only addresses the rules governing gifts from outside sources.
106. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202 (2016).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. § 2635.202(a), (d), (e).
110. Id. § 2635.203(d).
111. Meaning any gift that would not have been offered if the employee were not working for the
government. See id. § 2635.203(a)(2).
112. See id. § 2635.204 (b); see also Tillipman, supra note 105, at 3.
113. See Tillipman, supra note 105, at 3.
114. A centralized federal agency that coordinates ethics interpretations and standards for all three
branches of government. See U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, http://www.oge.gov (last visited Jan. 25, 2016) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
115. See Tillipman, supra note 105, at 4
116. See U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 114.
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government employees, and the effective dissemination and enforcement of those
standards, minimizes the opportunity for exploitable loopholes.
III. PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE ETHICS CODE REFORM IN VIRGINIA
Despite recent efforts to reform Virginia’s ethics laws, the patchwork of
bodies that the state charges with ethics oversight responsibility are still fraught
with limitations, and the state’s recent attempts to strengthen gift caps and gift
disclosure laws are still sieved with loopholes. The inadequacies in Virginia’s
ethics laws, which have and will continue to tempt political scandal, are in dire
need of further reform. Virginia’s ethics law reform should include the creation
of a powerful, nonpartisan, permanent ethics enforcement commission made up
of members of the public, and the adoption of more comprehensive rules
regulating who may give gifts to government officials.
A. Creating a Permanent, Independent, and Powerful Ethics Commission
Virginia’s legislature should replace the state’s ethics committee and
advisory council with an independent state ethics commission that combines the
strengths of successful commissions throughout the nation. Unlike Virginia’s
current ethics committee, which is partisan and powerless,117 the proposed ethics
commission would be independent, perform meaningful ethics audits, impose
stringent penalties for transgressions, and conduct mandatory ethics training for
all state officials and employees. In addition, the proposed commission would
hold monthly meetings to undertake investigations, hear allegations of ethics
violations, and issue advisory opinions on the law.
The composition of Virginia’s ethics commission should take into account
the need for political independence, expertise, and a diversity of perspectives. To
ensure maximum independence, the commission should be bipartisan, with a
combination of members of the public and gubernatorial appointees, and no
single political party should hold a majority of seats.118 Moreover, Virginia
should prohibit its ethics commissioners from holding public office two years
before and after their role on the commission, to ensure absolute independence
and protect against Hamilton-like quid pro quos.119 Each commissioner should
serve staggered four-year terms, to ensure that the commission retains a level of
institutional knowledge as experienced commissioners leave and new, potentially

117. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the inadequacies of Virginia’s current ethics commission).
118. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the differing compositions of ethics commissions throughout the country).
These composition rules are consistent with the national trend toward depoliticized independent ethics
commissions. Of thirty-nine states with statewide ethics commissions, almost all are bipartisan, and twentyeight are composed entirely of public members. See Crider & Milyo, supra note 22, at 721.
119. Two years falls within the middle of the range used by other states. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the
pre- and post-employment limitations states place on ethics commissioners).
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inexperienced commissioners join.120 The commissioners should also elect their
own Chair and Vice-Chair for two-year terms, but only public members should
fill these leadership positions to ensure the governor appointees do not exert
undue influence on the commission.121 This composition will ensure the ethics
commission is impartial, rich with institutional knowledge, and representative of
a variety of perspectives.
Virginia’s ethics commission should also have innovative enforcement
powers and broad jurisdiction. The commission’s enforcement tools should
include removing or suspending the transgressor from office, demoting the
transgressor, publicizing the transgressor’s wrongdoing, attaining restitution from
the transgressor for any inappropriate financial benefits, and instituting a variety
of fines against the transgressor.122 The commission should also be able to
enforce penalties for incoming or former commissioners that violate their pre or
post-commission employment restrictions.123 The commission’s jurisdiction
should also include government officials who committed an ethics violation
while holding public office, but have since left state service—provided that the
Commission’s investigation begins within one year from the date the transgressor
committed the alleged violation.124 This expanded jurisdiction would prevent
state employees from escaping liability for ethics breaches simply by leaving
office, yet the one-year requirement ensures some limitation on this power.125
The combination of broad jurisdiction and robust enforcement powers will ensure
Virginia’s ethics commission retains a conspicuous and authoritative presence.
In addition to the composition, jurisdiction, and enforcement powers of
Virginia’s ethics commission, the commission’s core mandate must include the
dissemination of the ethics standards throughout the state. Specifically, the
commissioners should brief and train every state employee—either in person or
online—on ethics requirements applicable to their position.126 Moreover, the
commission should require each employee to sign a document that certifies he or
she has undergone ethics training, and understands and vows to uphold the state
ethics rules.127 Ensuring the commission provides comprehensive ethics training
is essential for widespread adherence to these newly created standards.

120. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the term limits other states adopt for their commissioners).
121. Having public members hold leadership positions may be (or at least appear) more democratic and
fair than having the governor’s appointees running the meetings.
122. For example, an automatic fine of up to $50 per day for failing to file required disclosure and
authorization forms in a timely manner. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the range of enforcement tools states
empower their state commissions with).
123. $10,000 maximum per infraction is the national trend. See Piper, supra note 23, at 16.
124. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the jurisdictional limitations states place on ethics commissions).
125. See Piper, supra note 23, at 15.
126. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the OGE’s dissemination of ethics standards and training materials to
federal government employees).
127. See id.
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Critics of the proposal of this ethics commission may raise the concern that
Virginia’s state officials would never vote for, create, nor consent to the creation
of an ethics commission charged with such far-reaching powers, because the
commission would place significant burdens on their own lives. Such a concern,
however, is inapposite in Virginia’s case due to the recent national attention the
state’s lax ethics standards garnered.128 The incessant airing of Virginia’s
political scandals in the Washington Post, the national attention on the
McDonnells’ criminal corruption trial,129 the internal calls for reform by the new
Governor himself,130 and the widespread ridicule of Virginia lawmakers for
recently rejecting Governor McAuliffe’s proposal for such a commission131 all
put Virginia legislators under a powerful spotlight to address these inadequacies
regardless of the consequences to their individual lives. The establishment of this
independent, powerful, and multidimensional ethics commission would be a
significant step towards ensuring Virginia’s elected officials exhibit greater
ethics compliance in the future.
B. Adopting Stricter Definitions of Who Can Give Gifts to Government Officials
In addition to establishing an ethics commission, the Virginia legislature
should enact stricter and more comprehensive rules regarding who may give gifts
to government officials, which the commission can then enforce. Although
Virginia’s legislature recently attempted to reform the state’s gift caps and
disclosure requirements,132 additional legislation must address the gaping holes
that this prior attempt failed to patch.133
First, Virginia lawmakers should adopt clearer and stricter regulations on
who can give gifts to state officials. The federal ethics rules include a provision
that bars government officials from receiving gifts over the gift cap amount from
“prohibited sources,” and another provision that bars government employees
from receiving gifts on account of their official position,134 the latter of which
Virginia does not have. Adding this catchall provision that forbids the receipt of
gifts given because of a government employee’s official position will limit the
potential for exploitation of the rules by someone who is not a prohibited source,

128. See, e.g., Bob McDonnell’s Trial Comes to Merciful End, supra note 1.
129. Id.
130. See Kusnetz, supra note 16.
131. See Ginley, supra note 15 (emphasizing that Virginia legislators are effectively left to police
themselves).
132. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing Senate Bill 649 and House Bill 1211).
133. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the gaps and criticisms of Senate Bill 649 and House Bill 1211).
134. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the definitions the federal government uses in gift regulations).
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but is nonetheless interested in influencing the actions of Virginia’s state
officials.135
Relatedly, Virginia needs stricter rules defining the boundaries of permissible
gift giving between friends/family and state officials.136 As it stands now,
Virginia’s gift laws provide no suitable parameters defining the very loose terms
of “personal friendship,” and there is no oversight body ensuring the
characterization of the relationship as a personal friendship is legitimate.137
Similar to the federal rules, Virginia’s ethics laws should outline factors that
must be met to prove that the source gave a state official a gift based on their
personal friendship rather than their business relationship, including a history of
personal gift giving that existed prior to the commencement of any business
relationship.138 The proposed ethics commission,139 like the federal government’s
Office of Government Ethics, should extend exceptional scrutiny to these
“friendship” transactions to ensure that state employees do not exploit this
prospective loophole in the state’s ethics laws.140
Lastly, Virginia lawmakers should include reimbursement for travel to
national conferences in the definition of a “gift,” so that such travel is subject to
gift limits and disclosure requirements. Until interest groups are forced to
disclose and limit their funding of state officials’ travel, such interest groups will
continue to have a secret avenue around the state’s new gift caps. Without having
to disclose who is paying for state officials to attend certain events, interest
groups can continue to influence the agenda of state officials without anyone
knowing their involvement, which completely undermines Virginia’s ethics
reform efforts to date.141 Thus, Virginia lawmakers should revisit and adopt
Governor McAuliffe’s proposed disclosure requirements for such travel
arrangements.142 The benefit of adopting these comprehensive and detailed
exclusions to the gift rules is that when items given to state officials do not
squarely fall within the well-defined exceptions, the law will presume they are
gifts.
Critics of this reform proposal may argue that even if Virginia’s legislature
does pass these comprehensive reforms to the state’s gift cap requirements, state
officials may still decline to follow the rules. To support this concern, critics may
cite ethical failures and egregious scandals in other states, despite the states’

135. “Prohibited source” means the individual may not be a lobbyist or someone seeking business with
the government.
136. This is a category exempt from regulation in Virginia’s current law, which leads interested parties to
try to characterize their relationship with state officials as a “friendship” to escape facing any gift caps.
137. See Part 0.0.0.
138. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing federal rule 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204 (b), which outlines these factors).
139. See Part 0.0.
140. See Part 0.0.0 (discussing the close scrutiny the OGE pays to such transactions).
141. See Part II.B.1; Editorial Board, supra note 90.
142. See Part II.B.1.
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near-perfect ethics standards on paper.143 The proposed gift-law reform, however,
uses the federal laws as a model to avoid the weaknesses of current gift caps and
disclosure laws in other states, thereby decreasing the possibility that ethics
issues afflicting other states would occur in Virginia after this reform.144
Moreover, the concern that state officials will not follow a law is a feeble
justification for the avoidance of making the law in the first place. Once a law is
made, it will create new norms, place state officials under a brighter spotlight,
and make standards legally enforceable. Even if this comprehensive reform does
not eradicate Virginia’s pattern of corruption, the reform will at a minimum
result in less corruption than is currently escaping adjudication under the
Commonwealth’s weak ethics laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
Virginia’s current ethics laws are sieved with loopholes and in dire need of a
more complete reform.145 The two most troubling aspects of Virginia’s ethics
laws are the absence of an independent ethics commission to oversee and enforce
ethics laws and the glaring loophole in the rules governing what a gift is and who
state officials may receive gifts from.146 Examples of robust and effectual ethics
rules in states throughout the nation and at the federal level provide valuable and
well-tested models of the type of reform Virginia needs to undertake.147 It is
crucial for Virginia’s legislature to put aside their ideological differences and
formulate a bipartisan proposal to systematically reform the commonwealth’s
ethics laws. Absent comprehensive reform, the people of Virginia will continue
to lose trust in their government and the Washington Post will continue to stream
stories of the egregious scandals that Virginia’s broken system of ethics laws
engenders.

143. See, e.g., Jed Lewison, Leading New Jersey Paper Calls for Investigation of Yet Another Potential
Christie Scandal, DAILY KOS (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/01/27/1272884/-LeadingNew-Jersey-paper-calls-for-investigation-of-yet-another-potential-Christie-scandal# (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review). For example, New Jersey faces frequent ethics violations despite holding
the highest State Integrity Investigation ranking.
144. See Part 0.0.0.
145. See generally Laura Vollezza, McAuliffe Vows to Amend Ethics Bills to Close Loopholes, WASH.
POST
(Mar.
27,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/mcauliffevow...loopholes/2015/03/27/2e87b766-d48f-11e4-8fce-3941fc548f1c_story.html (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (describing the loopholes in Virginia’s current ethics laws).
146. Ginley, supra note 15.
147. See generally Links to States’ Legislative Ethics and Lobbying Laws, supra note 10 (providing
examples of the model ethics rules that Virginia should adopt).
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